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THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM:
Asian Security
without an American Umbrella

Larry M. Wortzel

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19970516 091

U.S. Army War College



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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE Dec 13, 1996		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Final Report
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security Without an American Umbrella (U)			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Larry M. Wortzel				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ACN 96034	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) The author argues that Asia is looking for stability and that U.S. support for the goals of ASEAN, through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, offers a unique opportunity to foster stability, prosperity, and the furthering of democracy in that region. Therefore, the author contends, multilateral dialogues, supported by the kind of credibility that results when policy and diplomacy have the support of strong, ready military forces, is needed.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS ASEAN; ARF; Asia-Pacific region; United States; post Cold-War world; Warsaw Pact; Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; NATO; human rights			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 44	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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
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**THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM:
ASIAN SECURITY
WITHOUT AN AMERICAN UMBRELLA**

Larry M. Wortzel

December 13, 1996



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FOREWORD

The United States is an Asian power, but its role and credibility lack clear definition in the minds of many Asian leaders. Some mistrust the United States, thinking it harbors chiefly economic, even "imperialist," motives. Others have little faith in U.S. commitments, recalling our about-face in Vietnam.

U.S. Asian policy today is a curious blend of seemingly firm bilateral commitments and occasionally startling ambiguities. The latter, while preserving American flexibility, run the risk of signalling weakness when friends and potential adversaries probe for clarity of purpose. This American "inscrutability" in Asia is all the more troubling in a region lacking a strong web of multilateral institutions, as exists across the North Atlantic. Indeed, if the United States is to maintain regional stability in Asia, Colonel Larry Wortzel, the U.S. Army attache in Beijing, argues, it must make multilateral dialogues like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum a major tenet of its Asian policy. The problems that need to be addressed by the United States in conjunction with its Asian friends, allies and potential foes—proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflict, territorial issues, trade relations, and the future of democracy throughout the region—are every bit as important to U.S. security in the Asian context as they are in Europe, where they receive intensive, continuous, multilateral scrutiny.

Therein lies the value of Colonel Wortzel's monograph. It calls our attention to the nascent ASEAN Regional Forum and causes us to consider its potential to enable a highly diverse group of nations to enhance their mutual understanding, stability, and security as they enter the 21st century.



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LARRY M. WORTZEL is a U.S. Army military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China and East Asia. As an infantry officer from 1973-77, he served in the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, GA, and the 9th Infantry at Camp Casey, Korea. He has served in intelligence and foreign area officer positions in China, Thailand, Singapore, and the U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii. From 1984-88 he served in policy-related positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and on the Department of the Army Staff in the Pentagon from 1990-93. From 1993-95 he was an assignment officer in Colonels Division at the Total Army Personnel Command. Colonel Wortzel holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Hawaii-Manoa. He is a 1995 graduate of the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Course. Colonel Wortzel is the author of *Class in China; Stratification in a Classless Society* (Greenwood Press, 1987), the editor of *China's Military Modernization: International Implications* (Greenwood Press, 1988), and is completing a book on 20th century Chinese military history. He has published several articles on China and on Asian security including "China Seeks Traditional Great Power Status" in the Spring 1994 edition of *ORBIS*. Colonel Wortzel was assistant Army attache in Beijing, China, from 1988-90. He returned to Beijing in July 1995, where he is serving as the Army attache to China.

THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM: ASIAN SECURITY WITHOUT AN AMERICAN UMBRELLA

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), first held in July 1994 in Bangkok, Thailand, is a unique, Asian-led experiment in multilateral security in Asia. It took shape at a time when the United States seemed to have withdrawn from its leading role in regional and world security, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, according to quotes attributed to a senior Chinese leader by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, despite assurances from Washington, the perception in Asia is that the United States would never trade one of its cities (Los Angeles was the city in question) for the goal of securing peace for one of its friends in Asia.¹

The ARF has been cast in theoretical language as an example of multipolarity and interdependence in the post-Cold War world. It has been compared and contrasted by some analysts with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The member nations of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), however, work hard to avoid comparisons with CSCE and see the situation in the Asia-Pacific region somewhat differently.² For them, the fundamental goal for regional cooperation is to create stability. The ARF concentrates on confidence-building measures and conflict avoidance. ASEAN leaders want to foster economic growth in a region with some tensions but no major conflicts, a region with the highest economic growth rate in the world. The CSCE and the 1975 Helsinki agreement, on the other hand, were instruments primarily developed to manage a specific, volatile, East-West conflict—that between the countries comprising the Warsaw Pact (with its Soviet leadership) and NATO. The CSCE goal was to “set the final seal on the map of Europe as drawn at Yalta.”³ ASEAN member states have worked hard to avoid that parallel. This monograph explores the genesis of the ARF and discusses how

perceptions of a U.S. withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific security scene affected the ASEAN states. The author argues that the ARF emerged as a regional solution to deal with potential threats. In conclusion, he discusses the ARF's future as ASEAN struggles to maintain the initiative in the forum.

For ASEAN, the key to the ARF's *raison d'être* is in dialogue to "avoid the potential for regional conflicts in the Asia Pacific."⁴ ASEAN members emphasize that the ARF is a "discussion of security matters, and not a common defense."⁵ When all is said and done, the impetus for the ARF and an Asian regional security dialogue is very different from that of the European situation. The CSCE came into being to moderate the threat of aggression between powers that were deeply hostile—the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the United States and its NATO allies. The ARF's genesis is the opposite. The ARF was born because of the perceived weakness or withdrawal of a power that before had provided the security umbrella for Asia—the United States.

The Perception of a U.S. Withdrawal.

The confidence of Asian friends and allies in the U.S. security umbrella has undergone a slow process of erosion over the past two decades. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the downgrading of relations with Taiwan as a means to help extricate the United States from Vietnam in 1972 were certainly factors in the process.⁶ Vietnam was the first really unsuccessful war for the United States in the 20th century, and, as Washington ended it, the United States sought to define its ideological differences with its stated enemies (Vietnam and China) in order to get out of the war. That process, which led to the opening with China but ultimately saw the collapse of South Vietnam and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, demonstrated for Asia the realpolitik of U.S. policy. More importantly, it demonstrated the significant effect of public opinion in the United States on America's foreign policy. The sudden shift in U.S. policy in relation to Taiwan and the recognition of

China 6 years later underscored that, in some cases, political reality, not ideology, drove U.S. policy. In one stroke, Washington withdrew its previous staunch support for Taipei.

In 1979, after breaking with Taiwan and recognizing China, President Carter announced that U.S. troop strength in Korea would be significantly reduced, and the confidence of Asian friends and allies in the United States was further eroded.⁷ Again, the strength and sincerity of U.S. security pledges were brought into question because the Carter reductions were seen as responses to domestic pressures. To many in Asia, the rationale for the reductions was based on unrealistic assessments of a potentially hostile situation on the Korean peninsula. Certainly the nations of Asia were more confident of the United States earlier, in 1976 for instance, when, in response to the axe murders of American soldiers in Panmunjom over a tree-cutting incident, the U.S. 2d Infantry Division was sent to combat positions with its weapons and ammunition ready for war, while U.S. troops trimmed the offending tree even as bomb-laden B-52s flew overhead.

The takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, and the failure of the hostage rescue operation in the desert did little to buttress confidence in U.S. military strength. More importantly, the difficulty of the naval, air, and logistical effort to support U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf convinced the Asian nations who witnessed it that the United States had difficulty projecting decisive conventional power over long distances. Even with bases in Japan and the Philippines, the U.S. military effort required support in the form of transit rights, refueling, and short-term basing from friends and allies in Asia. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean, became a key forward-operating base that proved to be equally critical to the U.S. strategy in the Gulf War during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM against Iraq.

In the years of the Reagan administration, a steady buildup of U.S. forces increased American capabilities. But the effect of the Vietnam War was seen in the "Weinberger

Doctrine,” which declared that the United States would not use its forces unless it had strong public support and was sure of a victory. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued that military forces cannot simply be brought to bear in any crisis, but that “we should engage our troops only if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory—without their strong invitation—when our own freedom is not threatened.”⁸ He set out six criteria to be used as tests when force should be employed. Weinberger’s more restrictive criteria on the use of force, however, are still influential today where they have been incorporated in President Clinton’s *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*.⁹

The success of Operation DESERT STORM with the decisive defeat of Iraqi forces had a mixed message for those countries dependent on U.S. security guarantees. The world witnessed the strength and lethality of U.S. weapons and equipment and the quality of U.S. soldiers. The tactics and the operational art of U.S. forces were validated. But this was done with an accommodation to multilateralism. As in World War II, the victory depended on a coalition of forces, and, perhaps more significantly, the United States ensured that there was United Nations (UN) support and participation before acting, despite the fact that its own vital interests were clearly at stake. Hindsight makes us question whether unilateral action such as the early insertion of a Marine Expeditionary Unit or a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division into Kuwait, combined with forceful diplomacy by the American Ambassador in Iraq, could have headed off the war, but that did not happen. Some nations perceived that the United States was reluctant to act decisively, not just unilaterally, but at all. The question had to be asked: “What if my nation is in trouble and, despite security guarantees, it became more expedient for the United States to bow to ‘United Nations’ or ‘coalition’ interests?”

In his book, *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger tells us that, in such an instance, political realism dictates that it is a mistake to assume that all nations are prepared to “run

identical risks" in opposing an act of aggression because, in the end, their national interests differ.¹⁰ This is a basic tenet of the realist school of politics. As Hans Morgenthau set forth in defining a realist theory of international relations, prudence and the weighing of consequences define the character of relations and interests.¹¹ The ASEAN states began to weigh the question of what was prudent for their own security.

After Operation DESERT STORM, a combination of economic, natural, and political circumstances brought into question the strength of U.S. commitment to Asia. The case of the Philippines brought this matter into sharp focus. Understanding the psychological impact of the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines is seminal in understanding why the ASEAN states have become so concerned about U.S. presence in the region. Domestic political forces in Manila called for either more money from the United States or for the dismantling of the U.S. presence in Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base. The Philippine government clearly was asking for more money than the United States would pay and the Soviet Union was collapsing, making the bases less critical to Washington. U.S. Pacific strategy began to examine the viability of the concept of "places not bases" (i.e., securing access rights with no permanent presence). Such a strategy, in addition to saving money and reducing military force structure, permitted the United States to be ambiguous about the involvement of U.S. forces in conflicts with China and Vietnam over any dispute, such as in the Spratly Islands. At the same time, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo made the Philippine bases for a time virtually unusable and too expensive to resurrect and repair for the dwindling U.S. defense coffers. U.S. forces simply withdrew and developed a series of base-use and port arrangements throughout Asia. To this day, however, some in the political and military establishments around Asia believe that the United States simply left when it got too expensive and hard to maintain those bases.¹² Their confidence in U.S. security guarantees and capabilities was shaken. At the time, the U.S. administration was able to credibly point out that the

United States was not acting like a colonial or occupying power and would remove its forces from a country when asked. That had already been demonstrated in Thailand in the mid-1970s. Nonetheless, the perception was that the United States left and abandoned a security commitment.¹³

The dispute with North Korea over nuclear materials and reactors is another example of a perceived weakness in U.S. resolve. No nation in the region wanted a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, despite calls by some U.S. pundits (even by Australian observers of Asian affairs) for forceful U.S. military action.¹⁴ The Chinese counseled patience and restraint, as did the Japanese.¹⁵ South Korea sought to maintain its strong role in the negotiations and in its relationship to the United States. The intervention of former President Jimmy Carter, however, while defusing the situation and producing an agreement, did not produce one that pleased all of the observers in Washington or in Asia.¹⁶ Serious concerns over North Korean facilities remain, and nuclear specialists have taken seriously a 1993 Japanese Foreign Ministry statement that "Japan must be prepared to defend itself against the nuclear threat."¹⁷ In the end, notwithstanding the provision of new reactors to Pyongyang, it remains possible that the United States may have accepted a North Korea with a limited number of nuclear devices as a *fait accompli*.¹⁸

The Evolving U.S. Force Structure and Strategy.

Communist governments are still in power in a few places around the world, but the communist challenge to democracy and free trade is essentially defeated. Its defeat brought forth a plethora of security challenges and problems ranging from terrorism, to population displacement, drugs, and the challenges of new conflicts based on ethnic and religious nationalism. Asia has not been spared these new problems but has remained relatively calm, compared to Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia. Adjusting to these changes after 45 years of Cold War tension has focused a sometimes partisan debate in the United States on the types of forces needed in the new era

and on the best strategy for securing U.S. interests in today's world.

Even if the global security system following the Cold War was not crystal clear, U.S. security strategy in East Asia and the Pacific gained definition with the publishing of the *National Security Strategy* in 1992.¹⁹ This document set out the framework of enduring U.S. interests upon which strategy might be adjusted based on exigencies and political realities. The security interests are:

- protecting the United States and its allies from attack;
- maintaining regional peace and stability;
- preserving U.S. political and economic access;
- contributing to nuclear deterrence;
- fostering the growth of democracy and human rights;
- stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems;
- ensuring freedom of navigation; and,
- reducing illicit drug trafficking.²⁰

There have been subsequent adjustments of note. In November 1992, Secretary of Defense Cheney provided assurances to regional allies in Asia that U.S. policy would be guided by six principles: (1) assurance of U.S. engagement in Asia and the Pacific, (2) a strong system of bilateral security arrangements, (3) maintenance of modest but capable forward deployed U.S. forces, (4) sufficient base structure to support those forces, (5) a request that Asian allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense, and (6) complementary defense cooperation.²¹

To put this statement by Secretary Cheney in context, one must remember that it was designed to reassure U.S. friends and allies of a U.S. commitment as a hint of doubt began to creep into the thinking of our friends in the region.

Bases were closing, forces were reducing, and, increasingly, the United States put more emphasis on the capabilities of allies. It was in 1991 and 1992 that ASEAN suggested using an expanded forum to promote dialogue on enhancing security in the region, and the Cheney assurances should be viewed, in large measure, as a response to the ASEAN initiatives. The desire on the part of ASEAN seems to have been based on the belief that there was no articulation of a new strategic view by Washington. Domestic economic and political forces in the United States created pressure for troop reductions and showed a tendency toward isolationism. If ASEAN suggested a dialogue to keep the United States involved in Asia, it was successful. However, the fact that ASEAN had to take the initiative showed that confidence in the United States was already slipping.²²

Even Australia, perhaps the most staunch ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, began to reexamine the outlook for a future U.S.-Australia security relationship as a result of the closing of the bases in the Philippines and the changes in the U.S. national security strategy.²³ Increasingly, Australia is becoming more engaged with ASEAN and its Asian neighbors. This is not surprising, given that between 1991 and 1993 the Pentagon's strategy for Asia called for a "10-12 percent reduction" of forces.²⁴ Since 1993, forces have been further reduced. The Australian reorientation toward Asia is a practical response as well. Australia is culturally and politically European (British), but geographically Asian. It has been the host recently to many immigrants from Asia and must become more engaged in the region.²⁵

The world has changed dramatically. The Warsaw Pact fell apart, the Berlin Wall was destroyed, and Germany has unified. Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, which itself dissolved. In response to these changes, which were the objective of the containment strategy, the United States reexamined its national security strategy.²⁶ The Department of Defense, in order to be able to respond to future threats, published a new defense strategy that focused on four foundations: Strategic Deterrence and

Defense, Forward Presence, Crisis Response, and Reconstitution.²⁷

Based on lessons from the Gulf War, and keeping in mind the continuing debate in the U.S. Congress over the future requirements for U.S. forces, the focus of the National Military Strategy shifted somewhat. The new strategy paid greater attention to the conduct of multilateral operations and collective security. Although the strategy cited the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War as a basis for the change, a dwindling U.S. budget, a swelling debt, and the changed world situation combined to limit what the United States could, or needed to, do within its own fiscal constraints.²⁸ The strategy is not only fiscally constrained, but is also limited by the ability of the United States to project its forces and put them on the ground when such forces are increasingly based in the continental United States. Faced with the new conditions, in order to correctly assess and define U.S. capabilities, the Clinton administration initiated the "Bottom-Up Review" (BUR) of U.S. forces, published in September 1993.²⁹

The Clinton administration's BUR was designed to "rebuild defense strategy, forces, and defense programs and budgets . . . to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."³⁰ With the over-arching Soviet threat gone, the focus of U.S. strategy became more regional in nature and was designed to "protect and advance American security with fewer resources."³¹ The new strategy was designed to be able to contend with two major regional conflicts in the world (the examples given in the BUR document were conflicts in the Persian Gulf and in Korea). The regional scenarios were chosen as planning tools that allowed U.S. military staffs to build appropriate, effective force packages to respond to crises based on theoretical and quantitative models derived from actual experience in the Persian Gulf and other conflicts. However, some ambiguity was built into the statements of U.S. capabilities.

When first announced, the BUR stated that the intent of the United States was to be able to respond to "two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."³² That key word,

“nearly,” seems to have been almost lost in the discussion of the strategy in the United States. When Secretary of Defense William Perry, in an October 1994 speech at the Chinese National Defense University, reiterated that the United States could not fight two major conflicts simultaneously, it caused some surprise in the Pentagon among some military officers who perhaps had not read the original document carefully.³³ However, to many Asians this echoed a revision of the U.S. and allied strategy in World War II, when a “win-hold-win” strategy called for the serial defeat first of Germany, then Japan.³⁴ Winning in the European theater while “holding” in the Pacific, then concentrating force on the defeat of Japan, was a sensible way to manage the combined effort in World War II. This historical parallel has not been lost in Asia, which had already seen that the United States placed its emphasis first on European and Middle Eastern interests.³⁵ Many Chinese military officers and Asian military attaches bring up the fact that the United States placed Asia as second in importance to Europe during World War II. They express their belief that this is still the case.

After much debate, the BUR fixed the U.S. force presence in Northeast Asia at about 100,000 personnel, divided primarily between Japan and Korea. The plans for the future, however, called for significant reductions of U.S. forces between 1995 and 1999, including two active and one reserve Army divisions, three active and four reserve Air Force fighter wings, one active and one reserve Navy air wings, and a carrier and 55 surface ships and submarines.³⁶

The strategy underlying the BUR was designed to bring forces to bear on regional dangers, but was really focused on deterring or defeating large-scale aggression. In Asia, that meant a focus on Korea. In Southeast Asia, where U.S. forces were no longer based, the rationale for a regional security dialogue was strengthened.

If the strategy debate in the United States added to the rationale for a regionally based security dialogue in Southeast Asia, earlier congressional testimony by the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for East Asian and

Pacific Affairs Winston Lord had demonstrated that the United States was prepared to support a multilateral approach to security consultation in the Pacific region. Ambassador Lord, who had experience in the region as an aide to Henry Kissinger in the 1970s and as the U.S. ambassador to China in the late 1980s, reminded the Congress that:

America has fought three wars in Asia during the past half century. We have abiding security interests there. Forty percent of our trade is with the region, its share swelling more rapidly than that of any other, and half again as large as with Western Europe. More and more eager, talented Asian immigrants enrich America's cultural and economic mosaic. Our nation's population and production shift steadily toward our Pacific coast. . . . We have enormous stakes in the Pacific. We need to integrate our economic, political and security policies. We need fresh approaches and structures of cooperation. . . . It is time to build—with others—a New Pacific Community.³⁷

Lord's plan called for the development of new, multilateral forums for security consultations in Asia. At the same time, Ambassador Lord indicated that in doing so, traditional U.S. alliances in Asia would continue.³⁸ However, the new policy emphasized that the United States would support Japan for a seat in the UN Security Council. Ambassador Lord carefully, even cryptically, referred to the need for Japan to make contributions "worthy of a major political and economic power" to world councils, and discussed security consultations, without specifically asking Japan to take a stronger hand in regional security.³⁹ This was perhaps one of the more delicate issues. When the Reagan administration asked Japan to take responsibility for patrolling the seas out to a distance of 1,000 miles, it raised some concerns in those nations in Asia that had suffered under Japanese aggression earlier in the century. Many of Japan's neighbors are not comfortable that the United States seems to be pushing Tokyo to break its own self-imposed boundaries or to stretch its constitutional restrictions on military activity and collective security.

Human Rights and U.S. Values as a Factor.

At the same time that the testimony sought to reassure Congress and U.S. allies of the U.S. commitment to the region, it underscored one of the greatest sources of tension for U.S. policy: how to support human rights and democracy while at the same time maintaining open trade and working toward security consultation and cooperation with countries in the region despite some disagreements over the concept of human rights. Lord candidly said that there is a necessary balance among "geopolitical, economic, and other factors" in the democracy and human rights equation. However, he pointed out that the "end of the global rivalry with the Soviet Union reduces the pressure to muffle concerns about unsavory governments for the sake of security."⁴⁰ Specifically mentioning China, Burma, and Indonesia, Lord set the U.S. agenda on human rights and democracy squarely in front of the Congress as a significant factor in policy.

This was and remains a very sensitive matter throughout Asia, where many states have taken a different view than that of the United States on what constitutes human rights and democracy. James Hsiung, in his study of human rights in East Asia, has characterized the Western concept of human rights as essentially "adversarial," something to be fought for by the individual. In Asia, however, according to Hsiung, there is a Confucian model in which "individual rights will be taken care of within the group or may be protected by purposeful distancing from external authorities."⁴¹ Hsiung has called this a "consensual model" under which individuals may be compelled to rise up only when authorities fail in their responsibilities to the group. The society becomes an extended family, with the government the benevolent patriarch. If the CSCE in Europe had a human rights component in the Helsinki accords, the nations of Asia, and especially ASEAN, want to avoid that component in their negotiations with the United States. Following this "consensual" or "Confucian" model, some Asian officials have emphasized that social stability and economic growth leading to the satisfaction of such basic needs as food, housing, and clothing are basic human rights

which sometimes must be satisfied, even if that means that a government must use more authoritarian means than that desired by the United States. In a spirited defense of the Asian view of human rights, Kishore Mahubani, of the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, sought to convince U.S. critics of Asian policies that culture and economic reality are important components to be considered when evaluating such policies. More recently, in the December 1994 issue of *Current History*, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore defended the new authoritarianism of Singapore as a model for Asia.⁴² Why all of this from Singapore? Clearly there are differences between the United States and Singapore on the issue, and they came to public attention at the time the articles were published because of such incidents as the caning of an American citizen for vandalism and the fine levied on an American professor for his veiled criticism of Singapore's system of justice. But there are other reasons as well, including the fact that Singapore's elder statesman, Lee Juan-yew, has been a staunch defender of China, where the United States has expressed more serious human rights concerns.

The continued dialogue between East and West on this issue illustrates the seriousness of the matter and underscores why ASEAN states (and their neighbors in Asia) are so concerned over the focus of U.S. policy now that Cold War tensions no longer provide the focal point for U.S. ideology and values. In historical perspective, however, this policy focus of the United States is really no different from that which provided the foundation for the Cold War values of the United States. The United States is a nation founded on a few basic principles, particularly respect for the individual, individual rights, freedom of expression, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press. The reason for the containment strategy of the Cold War, which was directed against the Soviet Union, was that the Soviets and their system were the greatest ideological and military threat against the things that the United States holds dear.⁴³ Now the Soviet Union exists no longer, and there is no over-arching military

threat to the United States. The containment strategy changed to one of engagement, particularly in Asia, and the United States continues to pursue its values in its foreign policy.

By July 1994, the Clinton administration defined its own national security strategy—one of “engagement and enlargement.”⁴⁴ An important facet of that policy, one that directly affects ASEAN and the Regional Forum, is the explicit call for a policy that facilitates regional integration. The rationale for fostering such regional integration was that nations that would work together in the absence of the United States may be willing to coalesce around the United States in a crisis.⁴⁵ The Clinton *National Security Strategy* set out the extent to which the national interest of the United States will dictate the “pace and extent” of U.S. engagement on an issue. It also gave warning that “where vital or survival interests of the United States are at stake, U.S. use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.”⁴⁶ However, many Asian countries remain confused by the policy, which they see as ambiguous. News correspondent Daniel Williams, in an analytical piece in *The Washington Post*, explained how the “comprehensive engagement” approach is sometimes confusing to other countries.⁴⁷ Using China as an example, Williams explained that rather than defining broad policy goals that would transcend other problems or issues (the “common ground of mutual concerns over national interest”), the United States might emphasize a “menu of missions,” any of which may get emphasis at a given time. According to Williams, this is confusing because a country never knows what is important. Military and political representatives from most governments in Asia still question the focus of comprehensive engagement. They routinely complain that they are confused over what the United States thinks is most important—trade, security, human rights, or weapons proliferation.

The concept of “enlargement” proves to be even more problematic than that of engagement. The strategy makes it clear that U.S. strategic interests are “served by enlarging

the community of democratic and free market nations," making a "commitment to free markets and respect for human rights" a key part of the strategy.⁴⁸ This statement defines the pursuit through foreign policy of the basic values upon which the United States was founded. This "enlargement" of U.S. interests was envisioned to include activities not only by government officials, but also through private and nongovernmental groups. It is no wonder that some countries in Asia still ruled by communist parties, particularly China and Vietnam, are uncomfortable with this new U.S. strategy, which they see as designed to undermine their governmental systems. The interesting dynamic in the region is that the very countries that initiated the ARF, the ASEAN states, feel threatened by China and are concerned about being abandoned by the United States. Nevertheless, some of these countries feel they are under attack by the United States on human rights grounds. Washington, of course, views this not as an attack by the United States, but as a strong, healthy dialogue on the values that the American people believe are important, and that the U.S. Government must therefore advance. To offset any potential threat from China, which presents the most direct threat to ASEAN, and to foster stability, ASEAN has opened its doors to Vietnam, also a target of the U.S. "enlargement" strategy.

ASEAN has also been building bridges with Burma, where China seems to be posturing itself to expand its military presence into the Bay of Bengal and developing bases that potentially threaten India.⁴⁹ The United States has taken explicit steps to isolate Burma, while ASEAN wants Burma in the dialogue.⁵⁰ One can see why some ASEAN states are ambivalent about the "enlargement" aspect of the new strategy. Nonetheless, the U.S. policy is a flexible one, and it permits momentum in any direction when Washington wants it. At least with respect to China, the United States showed that flexibility by de-linking China's Most Favored Nation status from its record on human rights and again in the settlement of the dispute on intellectual property rights in February 1995. More importantly, and this is perhaps not always recognized, the

strategy articulates U.S. values flexibly by making it clear that while "each nation must find its own form of democracy . . . there is no cultural justification for torture or tyranny."⁵¹

The debate in the United States over its role in the new international order and U.S. strategic interests has given rise to fears in Asia that the U.S. security commitment there could be weakened. The main shock to Asia was the U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay and the Philippines. One Washington-based representative from Singapore who watches regional security issues suggested that part of ASEAN's rationale for the ARF was to get the United States re-engaged in Asia in a "discussion of security interests in the Asia-Pacific." It took about 2 years to get the United States squarely involved. When the idea of a regional dialogue was first advanced, the United States seemed cool to the concept, since it threatened to undermine Washington's network of bilateral security commitments.

The Dragons of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

There are a variety of multilateral channels for the discussion of mutual interests in Asia: the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), held annually; the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), held after the AMM and attended by observer and dialogue partners; and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was designed to promote trade and investment in the Pacific Basin. The genesis for the ARF is from the ASEAN PMC meetings.⁵²

The concept of ASEAN security cooperation was initially raised formally by Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglaupus at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1989.⁵³ At that time, there was little support for such an expansion in the role of ASEAN, but Chinese activities in the South China Sea, combined with the U.S. military drawdown in the region, focused ASEAN on the need for some form of dialogue. A series of security seminars were held involving primarily nongovernmental entities that served as exploratory models for the ARF. The

first two were held within ASEAN in Manila and Bangkok in 1991. Workshops on the South China Sea were also held in Bali, Indonesia, in 1990 and 1991.⁵⁴ It was at these meetings that the discussion within ASEAN focused on the need for developing an Asian-based and controlled mechanism for internal dialogue over security cooperation. However, some of that dialogue was conditioned by the reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. Just prior to the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, Thai Foreign Minister Sarasin made it clear that, in the view from Bangkok, "a threat in Southeast Asia no longer exists," consequently, no U.S. base was welcome in Thailand.⁵⁵ This statement should be viewed as rhetoric for domestic political consumption. At the same time that Sarasin drew the line on U.S. bases, there was a strong U.S. association with Thailand through exercises, military exchanges, and landing/refueling rights. The Thais were clearly comfortable with the level of the U.S. presence in the region.

Early in 1992 there was some criticism within ASEAN of the agreements between Singapore and the United States over the potential basing of U.S. ships in Singapore. From the Philippines, especially, came accusations that Singapore was "trying to be the 'junior partner' of the United States" within ASEAN, and was acting like "America's little foot soldier" in the region.⁵⁶ Malaysia also reacted to any attempt by the United States to set up new bases in the region.⁵⁷ The situation within ASEAN prior to the conference was perhaps best summed up by an editorial in Bangkok's *The Nation*, which outlined individual national perspectives on the degree to which the United States should be involved in the region.⁵⁸ Both Indonesia and Malaysia wanted to work hard to maintain a nonaligned status (and Indonesia especially was working to draw Vietnam into the dialogue); Singapore and Thailand wanted a visible U.S. presence in the region; and Manila, still stinging over the U.S. withdrawal, continued editorial attacks on Singapore in the press, calling for closer cooperation within ASEAN on security matters.

There was a great deal of give and take at the 1992 ASEAN Summit. Singapore, after consultation with Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, ruled out any U.S. bases, but agreed to hosting a naval logistics element to provide support to the U.S. Navy under the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Vice President Dan Quayle and Lee Kuan Yew in Japan in November 1990.⁵⁹ ASEAN members agreed that no military alliance would be formed, since they saw no major threat to the region. However, ASEAN's goal was to expand cooperation with other countries in the region to "consolidate the existing equilibrium and peace and stability in Southeast Asia."⁶⁰ Individual national perspectives were aired, and these complemented the broader agreement. The declaration at the close of the summit asked for UN recognition of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia to resolve disputes peacefully and asked for implementation of the 1972 declaration of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)" in the region.⁶¹ However, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir stated his belief that any military cooperation within ASEAN should be bilateral and that no U.S. ships, particularly nuclear, should be in the region. Mahathir also strongly restated his country's long-standing position that there should be no military role for Japan in Southeast Asia.⁶²

By mid-1992, ASEAN nations began to implement the general agreements reached at the January 1992 summit. Singapore Defense Minister Goh Chok Tong and Indian Defense Minister Sharad Pawar met to discuss security in the region.⁶³ Sharad assured Goh that there was no reason that Southeast Asia should feel threatened by India.⁶⁴ In Japan, where there was ambivalence over any expansion of a military role, the Japanese press reported on a conference attended by members of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), where CASS researchers supported a U.S. military presence in the region and U.S. bases in Japan lest the Japanese government be tempted to increase their military forces to compensate for a U.S. withdrawal from the region.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, speaking at the National

University of Singapore, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called for more structured security consultations on regional issues. Alatas suggested both stronger confidence-building measures (CFBM) and transparency in military exercises in the region. He also called for a continuous forum for dialogue within ASEAN.⁶⁶

How should the meetings and statements after the 1992 Summit be read? It is clear that the greatest concern within the region was that the United States was wrestling with its own policies in the light of the end of the Cold War. Despite the assurances in U.S. policy documents and statements, including those in the *National Security Strategy*, doubt persisted in Asia. There was still the perception that the United States lacked a clearly articulated strategic paradigm which permeated and gave coherence to its post-Cold War foreign and national security policy. But there was disagreement within ASEAN as to the purpose of the organization and to the best approach to regional issues.

While the dialogue on the ARF continued, a parallel, nongovernmental organization (NGO) effort continued on a separate track (Track 2). The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), initiated in Kuala Lumpur in July 1992, brought together NGOs to explore some of the more difficult questions that would clearly bog down and ultimately halt formal discussions. For example, even today the CSCAP meetings are slowly and quietly wrestling with the question of how to have Taiwan represented along with China.

Nonetheless, the dialogue continued, and within the dialogue, a form of agreement emerged—a consensus that led to the ARF. If this seems a slow dance, taking place over a 5-year period, perhaps the answer is found in three points. First, there was, and is, no really significant threat within the region to which ASEAN has to react. The ASEAN nations want to be able to adjust to how the United States changes its posture in the Asia-Pacific, while the United States does not want to be pinned down, but prefers to concentrate on “national interest.” Second, bilateral

tensions between the ASEAN states have existed for years, and although there is the recognition of the need for a regional approach, the national interests differ enough that each country wants to avoid hasty action. Third, as students of Asia such as Lucian Pye would tell us, the political culture in the region is more comfortable with this sort of indirect dialogue, which leads to a recognition of individual sensitivities and positions on issues while a political consensus builds, but avoids confrontation by gently testing the waters on issues where there is friction.⁶⁷ The process has produced its own form of CFBM (the dialogue itself), and at least the formal process of an ASEAN Regional Forum began in July 1994.

ARF: Asian Security without a U.S. Umbrella.

The reduced U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific, combined with conflicting claims over the South China Sea islands, were the principal factors that contributed to the development of the regional security dialogue in ASEAN.⁶⁸ Even the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Charles Larson, in 1994, ruled out any new bases for the United States in Asia, preferring to rely on such activities as “ship repair in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, in addition to the other normal peacetime activities” to establish the U.S. presence.⁶⁹ This contributed to the feeling of insecurity in the region. The U.S. security policy was intended to ease concerns that the Western Pacific was an U.S. “lake.” However, the perception in Asia was that a power vacuum was created that could be filled by China, a resurgent Japan, or even India. The changed situation, and ASEAN’s own success as a means to discuss and resolve issues in a multilateral forum, made an ASEAN-led regional security dialogue more palatable in 1993-94 than it was before.

When the ARF met in Bangkok in July 1994, in addition to the six ASEAN countries, several “dialogue partners” were involved: the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and the European Union. “Observer countries” with significant economic and security interests

in the region (Laos, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, Russia, and China) were also invited. In all, there were 18 participants. At the invitation of the Thai government, a representative from Burma was present and took part in some sideline bilateral discussions.⁷⁰ Of note, the ASEAN dialogue was one that was indigenous to the region and was not dominated or controlled by the United States or another outside power.

An important backdrop to the Bangkok meetings was the perception that within Southeast Asia an arms race was taking place. At the same time that CFBM were explored, the ASEAN states individually began to build their defenses. Assessments of the new purchases of weapons in the ASEAN states have been mixed. Thailand began to explore air defense system upgrades, new armor systems, and maritime patrol mechanisms.⁷¹ Indonesia began discussion with India over ship maintenance, while it entered into discussions with the United States over aircraft systems upgrades.⁷² Malaysia explored a range of systems including British trainers, Russian MiG-29M fighters, and U.S. F-18D aircraft.⁷³ Malaysia also began to look into new helicopters from a variety of sources, a Polish version of the Russian T-72 tank, and organized a rapid deployment force to respond to threats offshore. Other ground systems flowing into Malaysia included Korean-made infantry fighting vehicles. The Philippines, strapped for cash, nevertheless began exploring the purchase of new fighter and trainer aircraft, naval and maritime air patrol craft, and infantry vehicles. Some analysts attribute the arms purchases to a normal evolution of military modernization based on improved economies; others see the new purchases as a means to discourage Chinese aggression.⁷⁴ But most of the ASEAN nations deny that the weapons modernization efforts are aimed at any other country. Rather, the purchases are said to represent modernization efforts designed to keep pace with the rapid technological advances in weaponry.⁷⁵

Chinese strategic thinkers, meanwhile, began to share their own assessments of the region, focusing on the growing

importance of ASEAN, economic factors and the dominance of Japan in the economic sphere, and the existence of major territorial disputes as reasons for developing some form of regional dialogue on security. The Chinese did not advance a specific form of security agenda but were obviously committed to be a part of the dialogue. The Chinese were strongly opposed to any linkage of human rights issues and trade sanctions to a security mechanism.⁷⁶ Their support for ARF helped Beijing counterbalance U.S. influence in the region and found allies who opposed U.S. human rights policies.

If there was a country targeted by the ARF, the targeting was discreet. No minister who attended the 1994 meeting singled out another country as the main threat. But at least one analyst in the region candidly said that "the idea behind the {ARF} is to try to tame the tiger. . . . All Southeast Asian countries see China as a potential threat . . . and there is general agreement that constructive engagement is the right approach."⁷⁷ But building a bloc against China was not the purpose of the meeting. The goal was to present a nonconfrontational but regional front to China. Instead of attacking a specific country, the meeting participants reviewed issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, means for conflict resolution, confidence-building measures, and peacekeeping. Among the proposals that were discussed at the ARF in Bangkok were the establishment of a regional peacekeeping center and a mechanism for preventive diplomacy.⁷⁸

In the discussion of China and its role in the region, Chinese legislation on the law of the sea and Beijing's right to use force to enforce maritime claims were central concerns.⁷⁹ Four major topics of concern at the ARF meeting were the question of Cambodia and the stability of its government, the South China Sea, Burma, and the continuing problems on the Korean Peninsula. Reportedly the Canadians, attending as dialogue partners, pushed for more formality to the meetings at some stage. But the ASEAN member states seem to have rejected this approach. With regard to arms purchases, the member states

attempted to reassure each other that new purchases are only for modernization and do not represent an arms race.⁸⁰ Although the United States avoided contact with Burma, which attended as an observer at the invitation of Thailand, ASEAN clearly wants Burma to be part of the dialogue. This is probably for two reasons: Burma's location in Southeast Asia and the apparent pressure by China to put Burma into its sphere of influence. More importantly, the decision to allow Vietnam to join ASEAN at the 1995 ministerial meeting in Brunei served as another hedge against China and helps to foster Vietnam's integration into the economy of Southeast Asia as Vietnam makes a transition away from communism to a market economy.

Singaporean analysis of the ARF identified the problem of the Spratly Islands as central to regional tensions. In a veiled reference to China, Singaporean editorials warned against "gunboat diplomacy" in the South China Sea, echoing similar words from the Canadian delegation at the meeting.⁸¹ The most significant difference that emerged, however, may be in approach. The same *Straits Times* editorial noted that Australia and the United States wanted to move quickly to upgrade regional security, while the "Asian view is that a comfort level be established first among ideological disparate members." Both China and Korea suggested that subregional forums be formed, including one in Northeast Asia comprised of North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, Japan and China.⁸² However, ASEAN now begins to fear that the ARF could take off and live a life of its own, herded in a different direction by Japan, China, or the United States, increasingly divorced from the ASEAN states and the Post-Ministerial Conference that gave birth to the ARF.⁸³

If ASEAN initiated a dialogue as a means to strengthen its own position and its own influence, as well as to draw the potential conflicting parties into discussions, the plan worked. The United States, still wrestling with a post-Cold War policy, was also drawn into the dialogue and, in the end, modified its own policies with the publication of the March 1995 Asia-Pacific strategy by the Clinton administration.

Although reluctant to be pinned down on the specific instances under which the United States might resort to force in the world, policy utterances in the United States made it clear that, while the United States still focused on pressing problems in Europe and in the Middle East, Asia is of vital importance to Washington.⁸⁴ The ARF process served U.S. interests, but Washington seemed to want a more formal and faster process. Regardless of speed, the ARF was the sort of dialogue that the U.S. strategy supported.

The 1995 ARF Meeting in Brunei.

In the intervening year between 1994 and the August 1995 ARF meeting in Brunei, Chinese actions once more drew attention to the South China Sea problem, while an ambiguous U.S. reaction again did little to reassure its friends in Asia. China, reacting to Filipino moves to secure a stronger footing in the Spratlys, seized Mischief Reef and built a military structure there to reinforce its claim. Despite proclamations that this was merely a "fishing structure," photographic evidence showed that there were military radars on the reef.⁸⁵ Manila reacted by sending out a few naval patrol boats, and fears in the region grew once more. Washington, despite its pronouncements that it was in the region as a forceful presence, took no official position on the Philippine claim to Mischief Reef or the Spratlys. In fact, Pacific naval commanders pointed out that the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty did not provide for a U.S. response to a foreign attack or seizure of this disputed territory.

ASEAN regrouped, thinking that it must reach accommodation with Beijing. It was months later that the U.S. Pacific Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Macke, finally made a firm statement of U.S. resolve to ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region and to maintain open shipping.⁸⁶ By the time of the August Brunei meeting, China declared its intent to discuss the Spratlys issue using the international Law of the Sea as a basis for settling claims.⁸⁷ Moving beyond procedural issues, the second ARF

Ministerial meeting took up substantive discussion on mutual CFBM, transparency in defense policy, search and rescue, and peacekeeping.

There were three main themes that could be discerned from a study of the 1995 meeting in Brunei: first, an over-arching concern about China, its growing military power, and its South Pacific maritime claims; second, an ambivalence toward the United States, evidenced by a continual desire to keep U.S. military forces involved in the security of the region, while struggling to maintain the ARF (and ASEAN) as a Southeast Asian-controlled security mechanism; and, third, a rejection of U.S. pressure on the sensitive issue of human rights, as evidenced by the admission of Vietnam and the formal observer status for Burma.⁸⁸

China Looms as a Factor in Regional Security.

Tensions in East Asia were complicated when Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was allowed to visit Cornell University in June 1995. This visit led to a series of military exercises and demonstrations of force by China in the Taiwan Strait, designed to influence the Taiwanese presidential election in March 1996, the U.S. Congress, and the Clinton administration. China wanted to remind officials in Washington that Taiwan is a "go-to-war" issue for the Beijing leadership. This message was also intended for ASEAN leaders, who had been permitting Taiwan officials more "international space." In addition, the exercises were also intended to suppress support among the Taiwan people for an independence platform.

China's robust military exercise schedule, which included a "conceptual" blockade of Taiwan established by use of exercise closure areas at sea, shocked Asia and the world. The closure areas, which were established to let Beijing launch cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in close proximity to the island, and the missile launches, proved to be a political disaster for Beijing.⁸⁹ ASEAN's concerns over Mischief Reef were reinforced by the firing of M-11 (Dong

Feng-15) ballistics from China into the vicinity of Taiwan in March 1996. The Chinese military exercises brought out two U.S. carrier battle groups in reaction, a move welcomed by Asian nations.

Despite Beijing's own pleas for understanding and assurances of China's peaceful intentions, China once more openly became the focus of ARF concerns.⁹⁰ China published a defense white paper in October 1995, outlining its peaceful intentions. Taiwan was treated by Beijing as a purely internal matter. China's military forces were characterized as only defensive in nature. But the Philippines was drawn into a joint defense Memorandum of Understanding with Great Britain in January 1996; Malaysia called for a greater Australian role in Southeast Asia; and Australia and Indonesia, two countries traditionally wary of each other, initialed a security agreement.⁹¹

All of these countries sought to avoid directly antagonizing China. However, the firing of missiles in close proximity to Taiwan reminded the ASEAN states that, despite China's "self-perception as a pacific, non-threatening country that wishes nothing more than to live in peace with its neighbors," Beijing has a disturbing history of using force to settle territorial disputes.⁹² In fact, since 1949, China has resorted to military force in territorial disputes in no fewer than 16 cases.⁹³

The 1996 ARF Meeting in Jakarta.

As the third ARF meeting in July 1996 approached, Robert Elegant, an established Asian-based editorial writer and author, focused attention on China. Elegant said that no foreign power will "define the role that China will play" into the 21st century. He concluded that, "China will remain assertive, justifying its behavior as retribution for nearly two centuries of exploitation by a militarily superior west . . . China's foreign policy will remain in the service of the regime's passion for revenge and power."⁹⁴ At Jakarta, therefore, the ARF members performed a balancing act.

The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting admitted Burma as an observer, which gave it the same status in the ARF. This is a mechanism to counter China's influence in Burma, and was a direct rebuff of U.S. human rights concerns.⁹⁵ In another move to check Chinese maritime influence, the ARF was expanded to include India, a modernizing Chinese rival for power.⁹⁶

Pressures from other countries to join the ARF, such as Great Britain, France, North Korea, and landlocked states like Mongolia and four central Asian republics caused ARF members to adopt formal criteria for membership.⁹⁷ Meanwhile, at the ARF meetings, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, Laos, Burma, Cambodia, the European Union, and Papua New Guinea took part as observers or dialogue partners.⁹⁸ Of note, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas made it clear that the ASEAN member states, in their control of the ARF, would not be overshadowed by observers or dialogue partners. Alatas said that the ARF will continue to focus on security, transparency, CFBM, and conflict resolution. However, Alatas warned, sensitive issues such as human rights would not "become automatically eligible" to be raised at ARF meetings, a rebuff of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.⁹⁹

In the wake of the 1996 ARF meeting, there were ample warnings to China about its use of force to settle disputes. Indonesia scheduled a major exercise around the Natuna Islands where there are natural gas deposits. In preparation for that exercise, one security specialist at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences said that, while Indonesia is engaged in a range of contacts with China, it "would be foolish for us to be completely naive. China respects strength. If they see you as being weak, they'll eat you alive."¹⁰⁰ In a separate set of exercises, the Five-Power Defense Agreement countries (Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) ran Exercise STARFISH. This involved over 20 aircraft and 21 ships from these five countries.¹⁰¹ Thus, despite a preference for not appearing as an alliance against

China, these countries revealed their continued concerns with the power of the Chinese "Dragon."

Conclusions.

There are some real problems for ASEAN, not the least of which is how to retain initiative and control as the dialogue expands and new countries are admitted to ASEAN. Canada pushes for formality, Northeast Asian countries push for separate forums, and the United States continues to pursue its policy of "enlargement," which for ASEAN means pressure over human rights. And the United States is trying to tell the ASEAN ministers what countries to admit to the status of dialogue partners.

ASEAN's perception is that the United States does not have a post-Cold War policy and strategy. In fact, the ambiguity of U.S. policy has been a major problem, one that was not corrected until the successive rounds of Chinese threats against Taiwan, when Washington finally deployed a decisive naval force of two carrier battle groups off Taiwan as a signal to Beijing that the United States will not stand by to see a military resolution to the political dispute between the Mainland and Taiwan. Although it may not be what ASEAN wants to hear, the U.S. policy and strategy has been set forth reasonably clearly. It is not a single-minded containment strategy. Nor is it a strategy that replaces the Soviet threat with a Chinese threat. China does not threaten the United States at the present time, and U.S. interests are best served by the inclusion of China in a dialogue as a responsible regional actor.

The United States seeks to maintain regional stability in the world; seeks to avoid ethnic and religious strife; wants to counter weapons and nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation; and seeks to advance democracy and human rights throughout the world. Participating in the multilateral dialogues like the ARF is a tenet of the new U.S. policy. The policy is flexible and is designed to bring the nations of the world into the international community. The strategy to implement the policy has political, military,

and economic components that permit Washington to employ U.S. power and pursue U.S. interests in a measured way. There is a plan of application for the regional interests of the United States and the existence of the ARF advances those interests. The United States is engaged and involved in Asia.

Dialogue may not work, and exercises are demonstrations of military force. If the ARF is to be more than a venue for communication and dialogue on transparency, it is really up to ASEAN to make it so.¹⁰² If ASEAN is afraid of the Chinese "Dragon," ASEAN must continue to engage China or must confront China on issues either as a body or as individual states. However, the "slow dance" in Bangkok in July 1994 failed to keep the Chinese from seizing another part of the Spratlys in February 1995, when Beijing took over Mischief Reef. Perhaps the ASEAN states would do well to review again the U.S. policy, which permits pressure through a variety of levers: economic, political, military, and even ideological. With such strong economies but weak militaries, there could still be a way to tame the "Dragon" through economic pressure. China depends heavily on investment to prop up its regime and stabilize economic growth. In the final analysis, however, as Indonesian strategist Dewi Fortuna Anwar pointed out, fundamentally, the "Dragon" respects strength.¹⁰³

ENDNOTES

1. The title of this paper is not meant to suggest that the U.S. role in Asia has been solely to provide a nuclear umbrella for the region. The term "umbrella" is used here in the sense of simply providing some protection, as a barrier against other elements. The comments attributed to an unnamed Chinese official by Freeman were in response to China's perceptions about how far the United States would go to help Taiwan in the face of the threat of a Chinese invasion precipitated by a declaration of independence from mainland China by Taiwan's leadership.

2. ASEAN was formed on August 9, 1967, by Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to strengthen regional cohesion and self-reliance, with special emphasis on economic, social, and cultural cooperation and development. Brunei was later admitted

as a member nation. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995. An excellent example of the framing of the security debate in Asia in theoretical and policy terms related to the European debate may be found in Stephen J. Blank, *Helsinki in Asia*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993. Blank compares the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region with that in Europe. Barbara Opall and Naoaki Usui, staff writers for *Defense News*, wrote that some attendees at the ARF drew parallels between the 1975 Helsinki Accords in Europe and the ASEAN meeting (*Defense News*, August 1-7, 1994, pp. 1, 26). However, as this paper will argue, the ARF is more about security, confidence-building, and transparency. The human rights component of the Helsinki Accords is probably the area in which there is the least agreement within the ASEAN states, especially with the desire of ASEAN to admit Vietnam and to include Burma (Myanmar) in the dialogue. At the July 1994 ASEAN Ministerial meeting in Bangkok, the subject was sidestepped; see *The Jakarta Post*, July 26, 1994, p. 4, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-Southeast Asia* (hereafter cited as *FBIS-EAS*)-94-149, August 3, 1994, p. 53.

3. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was seminal in changing the pace of democratization and cooperative threat reduction in Europe. The human rights initiative in the Helsinki Final Act is a feature that is not on the table for the ARF. Perhaps the most important features of the CSCE are the mutual security measures that followed, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the process of developing confidence and security-building measures (CSBM). See Massimmo Dal Piaz, "A Regional Perspective on European Defense," *Parameters*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 57-65. The process by which the former Warsaw Pact countries were drawn into security cooperation with NATO in the Partnership for Peace is explained in Michael Ruhle and Nicholas Williams, "Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO," *Parameters*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 66-75.

4. "One on One: Lieutenant General Herman Mantri, Chief of General Staff, Indonesian Armed Forces," *Defense News*, October 31-November 6, 1994, p. 30.

5. Indonesian Embassy to the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Tjahjono at the Morning Newsmaker Press Conference, National Press Club, Washington, DC, July 14, 1994. The author is indebted to Mr. Peter Hickman of the National Press Club, sponsor of the conference, for providing a transcript and videotape of the conference for use in the preparation of this paper.

6. In his book, Henry Kissinger notes that the conflicting views of China and the United States over international affairs, and on Taiwan and Vietnam, were significant factors in the Shanghai communique. Although Kissinger treats the U.S. extrication from Vietnam in another

chapter of his book and links the China recognition with triangular diplomacy and geopolitics relative to the Soviet Union, the author's own experience with Asian military leaders and diplomats is that they see the way that the 1972 communique was made, and President Carter's subsequent announcement of formal diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China, as singular examples of how the United States "treats its friends" in the interest of expedience. See Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, pp. 674-702, 725-732.

7. Indeed, when Major General John Singlaub, then assigned to U.S. Forces Korea in a senior position, challenged President Carter and was fired, it was Singlaub who was proven correct after a new assessment of North Korean troop strength and intentions. Although senior leaders may have privately advised Carter not to reduce troop strength, and the move was the subject of great debate on Capitol Hill, the fact that Singlaub went public (a rare thing for a senior military officer) demonstrates how strongly he felt about the matter of both China and North Korea. Singlaub parachuted into Hainan Island in World War II and later saw it fall to the communists. Then he fought in the Korean conflict where he also parachuted into North Korea. He was a veteran Cold War warrior who had worked with the CIA in special operations.

8. See Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," *Defense '85*, Armed Forces Information Service, Arlington, VA, December 1985, pp. 2-11.

9. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House, Washington, DC, July 1994, p. 10.

10. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 249.

11. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: Knopf, 1960, pp. 27-35.

12. For almost 3 years, from 1990-93, the author had the opportunity to meet monthly with groups of about a dozen military officers from the Asia Pacific region who were visiting the United States. These officers were generally in the grade of captain or major with about 6-14 years of service in the armed forces. This was almost uniformly their opinion. During the same period, the author met monthly with military attaches from the Asia-Pacific region based in Washington, DC. Their perceptions of the U.S. action were roughly the same—that there was a U.S. withdrawal. Chinese strategic thinkers have also expressed concerns over a U.S. withdrawal, although they are more concerned about Northeast Asian stability and Japan. See Du Youkang, "Southeast Asia: An Uncertain Factor in Sino-U.S. Relations," *Shanghai Institute for International Strategic Studies Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 1996, pp.

23-24; Yan Xuetong, "China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy," *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 1995, pp. 2-3.

13. During the same period Philippine officers in particular were incredulous that the United States withdrew. They were deeply concerned about the South China Sea and whether the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty applied to the Spratly Islands. U.S. officials take the position that the islands are disputed territory and are not covered by the terms of the treaty, but the United States would like to see the dispute settled peacefully.

14. North Korea continually insisted that the United States and South Korea suspend Exercise TEAM SPIRIT before any UN or International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors could gain access to some facilities under the December 1991 agreement signed between the two Koreas on denuclearization. A number of U.S. political commentators, including Victor Gilinski, a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commissioner, and Henry Sokolski, a former DoD official in the Bush administration, insisted that strong measures were the only effective way to bring Pyongyang to the point of permitting the agreed inspections (*Washington Post*, November 23, 1994, p. A19). See "Clinton advised to offer halt in exercises with South Korea," *Washington Times*, November 16, 1993, p. 1; "U.S. Weighs N. Korean Incentives," *The Washington Post*, November 17, 1993, p. A31; "South Korea begins to anger as North vetoes nuclear inspection," *Chicago Tribune*, May 5, 1994, p. 12; on Australian views, see "Australia: Military Authorities Edgy over Potential Asian threat," *Ottawa Citizen*, May 3, 1994, p. F13. A particularly strong attack arguing against compromise with North Korea came from the Republican Party at a July 1994 gathering. There the Republican National Committee Foreign Policy Forum membership said that the Clinton administration lacked resolve in facing down North Korea. However, a *Washington Post* article on the meeting noted that the Bush administration took no action in 1989 when it became obvious that North Korea was diverting nuclear material to build a bomb. The Republican Party attacks were dismissed as largely partisan rhetoric aimed at the November 1994 congressional and gubernatorial elections (*The Washington Post*, July 28, 1994, p. A23).

15. "U.S. and China Reach Accord at UN on Korean Nuclear Issue," *New York Times*, April 1, 1994, p. 7.

16. "U.S. Aide Admits North Korea Nuclear Policy May Not Work," *New York Times*, May 6, 1994, p. 6; "U.S. Mustn't Tread Too Quickly in Asia," *Long Island Newsday*, August 24, 1994, p. 31.

17. *The Washington Post*, November 10, 1993, p. 13.

18. For a synopsis of the positions on this issue, see "Congress Mixed on North Korea Nuke Deal," and "Last-minute Move Kept U.S. from War in Korea," *Army Times*, Alexandria, VA, February 13, 1995, p. 26. See also Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Arsenal: Motivation, Doctrine, and Possible Employment," Special Report No. 9, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1996. The *Jane's* special report suggests that North Korea has at least two nuclear weapons in its inventory.

19. The publication of the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* as unclassified documents proved to be a superb step in inducing a positive dialogue around the world on general military intentions and on confidence-building measures.

20. "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," A Presidential Report to Congress Prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1992. This was updated in February 1995 with the publication of "United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," in which Secretary of Defense Perry announced the stabilization of force levels in Asia.

21. *Ibid.*

22. At a National Press Club conference in Washington, DC, on July 14, 1994, Philippine Ambassador Race reminded participants that Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Mangalapus, during the ASEAN Post Ministerial conference held in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1989, broached the topic of security cooperation in ASEAN. The dialogue on security cooperation really took off, however, as the United States began to depart the Philippines. Partial transcript prepared by the Australian Embassy Public Affairs Office, Washington, DC.

23. See Thomas-Durell Young, *Australian-U.S. Security Relations in the Post-Cold War World*, SSI Special Report, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 20, 1993. In an interview in *Defense News*, July 18-24, 1994, p. 62, Australian Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General John Grey commented that Australian defense priorities remain with the United States, but that the United States does not dominate Australian strategic thinking. The growing relationship with regional friends is important and calls for Australia to be an equal partner in the region. The Howard government has revitalized its links with the United States while continuing to maintain close ties with Southeast Asian nations; see *International Herald Tribune*, July 26, 1996, pp. 1, 4.

24. William J. Crowe, "Rethinking Pacific Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1991, p. 126.

25. Today an Australian Army officer must speak an Asian language prior to advancement to field grade rank. Australian defense policy has acknowledged geographical reality.

26. On the containment strategy, see "Telegram No 511: The Long Telegram," The Charge in the Soviet Union (George F. Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946, reprinted in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Vol. 6, pp. 696-709; "X" (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1947, pp. 566-582; and NSC 68, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary, Washington, April 14, 1950," in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, pp. 234-292.

27. *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

29. Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 1, 1993.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

33. *The Washington Post*, October 19, 1994, p. 34; *The New York Times*, October 19, 1994, p. 14; *Baltimore Sun*, October 19, 1994, p. 6; *Washington Times*, October 19, 1994, p. 13.

34. Louis Morton, "Germany First, The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in *Command Decisions*, Washington, DC: Office of the U.S. Army Chief of Military History, 1959, pp. 11-17.

35. This emphasis should not surprise anyone. The majority of the U.S. population is still culturally of European origin; American political, legal, religious, and economic traditions are based on European practice; and the nations of Western Europe are all democratic states with freely-elected governments. The containment strategy targeted the Soviet Union because it sought to destroy those traditions. Moreover, taken collectively, Europe still represents a major market for the United States.

36. Les Aspin, "Bottom-Up Review" press briefing slides, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 1, 1993, p. 40.

37. Winston Lord, "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Foreign Policy," testimony before Congress, Washington, DC, March 31, 1993, p. 2.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 4. The ten goals are: 1) Forging a fresh global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibilities; 2) Erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula; 3) Restoring firm foundations for cooperation with a China where political openness catches up with economic reform; 4) Deepening our ties with ASEAN as it broadens its membership and scope; 5) Obtaining the fullest possible accounting of our missing in action as we normalize our relations with Vietnam; 6) Securing a peaceful, independent and democratic Cambodia; 7) Strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian-Pacific economic cooperation; 8) Developing multilateral forums for security consultations while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances; 9) Spurring regional cooperation in global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, non-proliferation and arms sales; 10) Promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower.

39. Lord, testimony, p. 5.

40. Lord, testimony, p. 14.

41. James C. Hsiung, ed., *Human Rights in East Asia: A Cultural Perspective*, New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1985, p. 14.

42. Goh Chok Tong, "Social Values, Singapore Style," *Current History*, December 1994, pp. 417-422; Melanie Chew, "Human Rights in Singapore: Perceptions and Problems," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 11, November 1994, pp. 933-948; also see Meredith Woo-Commings, "The 'New Authoritarianism' in East Asia," *Current History*, December 1994, pp. 413-416.

43. Read the Constitution and *The Federalist Papers*, New York: New American Library, 1961. On the containment strategy, see "X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." See also George F. Kennan, "Telegram No. 511: The Long Telegram." Henry Kissinger analyzes the containment strategy in *Diplomacy*, pp. 446-472.

44. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

47. "China Finds Comprehensive Engagement Hard to Grasp," *The Washington Post*, February 13, 1995, p. A17.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19. The U.S. emphasis on human rights has continued in the 3 years since the ARF began to meet. At the 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta, Secretary of State Christopher's July 23 statement renewed attacks on the SLORC government in Burma for its "refusal to heed the desire of a majority of the Burmese people for a transition to democratic rule and its increased harassment of the democratic opposition." See U.S. Information Agency Wireless File, Wednesday, July 24, 1996, pp. 16-18.

49. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," *Orbis*, Spring 1994, pp. 157-176. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 16, 1993, p. 26. Burma will probably be admitted to ASEAN at the 1997 meeting. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995. *International Herald Tribune*, July 28, 1995, pp. 1, 10.

50. "U.S. Steps Up Campaign to Isolate Burma Rulers," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1994, p. A20; *The Straits Times*, Singapore, July 28, 1994, p. 28, *FBIS-EAS-94-147*, August 1, 1994, p. 82; see also *FBIS-EAS-94-144*, July 27, 1994, p. 1.

51. William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, July 1994, p. 24. In response to many comments from Asia, the Clinton strategy responds by saying that "democracy and human rights are not Occidental yearnings; they are universal yearnings and universal norms."

52. See David Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," *Current History*, December 1994, pp. 423-429.

53. Philippine Ambassador Raul Ch. Rabe to the National Press Club Morning Newsmaker Press Conference, Washington, DC, July 14, 1994.

54. Comments by Brunei Darussalam Ambassador Haji Jaya bin Abdul Latif, National Press Club, July 14, 1994.

55. *FBIS-EAS-92-006*, January 9, 1992, p. 58.

56. *Manila Chronicle*, January 8, 1992, p. 4, in *FBIS-EAS-92-005*, January 8, 1992, pp. 44-45.

57. *FBIS-EAS-92-003*, January 6, 1992, pp. 44-45.

58. *The Nation*, Bangkok, Thailand, January 23, 1992, p. A10, in *FBIS-EAS-92-015*, January 23, 1992, pp. 1-2.

59. See *FBIS-EAS-92-017*, January 27, 1992, pp. 1-4. Also see Lee Lai To, "Beyond Containment: The Future Utility of the U.S. Presence in the Asia-Pacific--A View From Southeast Asia," in Ronald N. Montaperto, ed., *Cooperative Engagement and Economic Security in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 119-136.

60. *FBIS-EAS 92-017*, January 27, 1992, p. 1.

61. *FBIS-EAS 92-019*, January 29, 1992, pp. 1-4.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

63. Although Singapore was not threatened by India, there were reasons for concern. Naval conflict between India and China, a remote possibility, would present a threat to trade and commerce in the region and could affect passage of the straits. Also, in the event of ethnic or religious tensions between Hindu and Moslem populations in Singapore, Malaysia, or Indonesia, there is concern in Southeast Asia that India could become the "protector" of the Hindu populace. While such "protection" would only be a pretext for action, there is a precedent, such as when Beijing challenged Vietnam in 1978 over the treatment of ethnic Chinese in south Vietnam.

64. *FBIS-EAS-92-041*, March 2, 1992, pp. 48-49. How Sharad justified this statement is hard to see, since at the time India had two aircraft carriers, 26 major surface combatants, and 15 submarines, including a nuclear submarine. Australia certainly viewed India as a potential threat, as did China.

65. *FBIS-EAS-92-076*, April 20, 1992, p. 11.

66. *FBIS-EAS-92-210*, October 29, 1992, pp. 39-40.

67. Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Press, 1985. Whenever one attempts to characterize in generalities cultural norms or forms of behavior, one is open to charges of having reified the culture of "orientalism." However, the issue of "face" (*mianzi* in Chinese) is a very real one in most cultures in Asia (as it is in Latino, Arab, and Southern Italian culture). Parties avoid direct disagreement or dispute in a negotiation to give "face" to the other side. National or personal negotiating positions are often put on the table informally or through third parties in early consultation to insure that there will be no confrontation at formal sessions. This is not to say that Asians avoid decisive action or are afraid of confrontation; but "face" is always a consideration, and direct confrontation is not the preferred style.

68. P. Lewis Young, "With Declining U.S. Presence, ASEAN Banks on Interdependence," *Armed Forces Journal*, Vol. 130, No. 8, March 1993, pp. 25-26. See also Pan Shiying, "The Nansha Islands: A Chinese Point of View," *Window*, September 3, 1993, pp. 23-36; "Flashpoints Update," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, January 2, 1993, pp. 18-19.

69. Jim Mann, "Retooling Southeast Asia Geopolitical Map," *Los Angeles Times*, February 4, 1994, p. 1.

70. See *FBIS-EAS-94-144*, July 27, 1994, pp. 3-5, on various national positions with respect to Burma's participation and the human rights situation in Burma.

71. *Defense News*, October 16-24, 1994, p. 10.

72. *Ibid.*; see also *Defense News*, August 22-28, 1994, p. 18.

73. *Defense News*, October 10-16, 1994, pp. 1, 36.

74. See Philip L. Ritchelson, "China's Impact on Southeast Asian Security," *Military Review*, May 1994, pp. 44-57, especially 50-53; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59; Michael Richardson, "Southeast Asia Maritime Allies Gingerly Keep Up Their Guard," *International Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1994, p. 6.

75. Barbara Opall, "Modernization Effort Fuels Pacific Arms Buys," *Defense News*, October 24-30, 1994, pp. 10, 22.

76. He Fang, "Safeguard and Promote Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), No. 1, March 1994, pp. 93-95.

77. Interview with Kusuma Snitwongse, Director, Institute of International Studies, Bangkok, in Barbara Opall, "Southeast Asian Allies Keep a Wary Eye on China's Might," *Defense News*, October 24-30, 1994, p. 16. The general consensus seems to have been that if not now, certainly in the next decade, China will be a potential threat to the region.

78. Peter Maitri Ungphakon, "How Effective is the ASEAN Regional Forum," *The Sunday Post*, Bangkok, July 31, 1994, p. 18, in *FBIS-EAS-94-147*, August 1, 1994, pp. 92-95.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 93. See also "Gunboat Diplomacy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 16, 1994, pp. 22-26.

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80. Ungphakon, "How Effective is the ASEAN Regional Forum," pp. 93-94.
81. *The Straits Times*, July 28, 1994, p. 28, in *FBIS-EAS-94-147*, August 1, 1994, p. 82.
82. *FBIS-EAS-94-143*, July 26, 1994, pp. 6-8.
83. Frank Ching, "Growing ASEAN Faces Strains," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 29, 1994, and January 5, 1995, p. 23.
84. Department of Defense, Office International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 1995.
85. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 5; *International Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 7.
86. See "A U.S. CINCPAC Perspective on East Asia," *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 10-17.
87. *International Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1995, pp. 1, 7.
88. Speech by Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Singapore, at the Third Asia-Pacific Defense Conference, February 6, 1996.
89. See "Boost in Chinese Buildup Fuels Asian Worry," *Defense News*, January 29-February 4, 1996, p. 6; "Beijing's Aggressive Hard Line is Bad News for China, Too," *International Herald Tribune*, August 1, 1995, p. 6.
90. For its own part, China published a defense white paper and also issued calls for military transparency and dialogue. See Luo Renshi, "On the Ways of and China's Efforts in Increasing Transparency in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Strategic Studies*, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 10-13.
91. *FBIS-EAS*, January 4, 1996, p. 35; Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, December 14, 1995.
92. John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1993, pp. 250-252.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
94. *International Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1996, p. 8. The annual Japanese Defense White Paper also identified China as a greater threat

than Russia to regional security; see *The Straits Times*, July 20, 1996, p. 3.

95. *International Herald Tribune*, July 20-21, 1996, pp. 1, 5.

96. *The Straits Times*, July 20, 1996, p. 3; *International Herald Tribune*, July 23, 1996, p. 4. See also Wortzel, "China Seeks Traditional Great Power Status," *passim*.

97. *Viet Nam News*, July 20, 1996, pp. 1, 6.

98. The seven ASEAN states today are Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bunei, and Vietnam. Dialogue partners are the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, China, India, and Russia. Other countries are observers.

99. *Viet Nam News*, July 26, 1996, p. 6.

100. Quoted in "Indonesia Plans War Games to Caution China," *International Herald Tribune*, August 16, 1996, p. 4.

101. *International Herald Tribune*, September 30, 1996, p. 4.

102. Shambaugh, "Pacific Security in the Pacific Century," p. 428. Shambaugh criticizes the ARF as "an important channel of communication, but of little significance except for articulating perceptions, voicing concerns, seeking clarification, and building confidence." He dismisses a little too quickly some very important aspects of diplomacy and security policy.

103. See *International Herald Tribune*, August 16, 1996, p. 4.

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